Here is a short video about some of the underlying ideas of my work.
My habilitation project is titled Morality and the Challenges of Conative Conflict. For this project, I work on hybrid-expressivism, moral metaphysics, moral justification, moral memes, and the nature of practical deliberation.
In 2018, Jacob Rosenthal and I organized a colloquium titled Moral Philosophy and the Sciences at the GAP conference in Cologne. It focused on interdisciplinary and empirically informed approaches to moral philosophy. Our invited speakers were Valerie Tiberius, Guy Kahane, and Neil Roughley.
In 2017, I was an associated fellow at the Zukunftskolleg Konstanz. In the framework of the Zukunftskollegs mentorship program I worked on the challenges of conative conflict with Jimmy Lenman. Ever since then, I have become more and more impressed about expressivism.
In July 2017 we held a small workshop on Jimmy's new book in the making, The Possibility of Moral Community, at the University of Konstanz.
My dissertation, The Origin of Oughtness, was published with De Gruyter in summer 2018. Here is the abstract:
How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently.
I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory – metaethical conativism – and defend it against some historically influential objections.